On September 29, 2026, Lindsay Clancy returned to Plymouth Superior Court for the first time since her murder trial ended in a mistrial. Her attorney, Kevin Reddington, renewed a request under Massachusetts Rule of Criminal Procedure 25 asking Judge William Sullivan to enter findings of not guilty rather than permit the case to return to another jury.
Two days later, Judge Sullivan denied that request in a five-page written ruling.
Online, the decision was quickly compressed into competing headlines: the judge had “rejected the insanity defence,” the judge had “confirmed her guilt,” the defence had suddenly claimed Clancy “didn’t do it,” or the court had ordered a retrial.
None of those descriptions is quite accurate.
The ruling was narrower—but still important. Sullivan decided that the Commonwealth had introduced enough evidence for a rational jury to find that Clancy committed the killings and was criminally responsible. He did not decide that she was guilty. He did not decide that the defence experts were wrong. And he did not decide whether trying her again would violate double-jeopardy protections.
Those distinctions matter.
What Reddington Asked the Court to Do
A Rule 25 motion tests the legal sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence. At this stage, the judge does not reweigh the evidence as though he were the thirteenth juror. He must view the evidence in the light most favourable to the Commonwealth and allow the prosecution the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it.
The question is therefore not: Which side had the more persuasive case?
It is: Could a rational jury, viewing the prosecution’s evidence favourably, find every required element beyond a reasonable doubt?
Reddington attacked the case on two fronts. First, he argued that the Commonwealth had failed to prove Clancy was the person who killed the children. He criticized the investigation, the forensic work and what he characterized as assumptions made by police. Second, he argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove criminal responsibility because the psychiatric evidence established that Clancy lacked the required mental capacity.
The first argument startled many observers because the six-week trial had largely focused on why Clancy killed the children and whether she was legally responsible—not on an affirmative claim that some unidentified person may have committed the killings.
That does not make the Rule 25 argument procedurally improper. Defence counsel may challenge whether the prosecution proved each element even when the trial strategy concentrated elsewhere. Reddington had also raised sufficiency motions at the close of the Commonwealth’s case, after the defence rested and after rebuttal. Still, the way the argument was framed on September 29 represented a striking rhetorical shift from the case the public had watched.
What Reddington Said During the Trial
The suggestion that Reddington had never previously said Clancy killed the children is not supported by the trial record. Although counsel’s questions and closing argument are not evidence—and did not relieve the Commonwealth of its burden—Reddington repeatedly proceeded on the express premise that Clancy committed the physical acts.
During his cross-examination of Patrick Clancy on Trial Day 2, Reddington referred to a period “before she killed the children.” On Day 8, he asked Amy Bevins whether she knew that her friend “had killed her three beautiful children.” On Day 10, he described Clancy’s appointment with Dr. Jennifer Tufts as occurring “the day before she killed the kids.”
The clearest statement came during Reddington’s cross-examination of prosecution psychiatrist Dr. Avram Mack on Trial Day 19:
“I’m referring to the fact that this young lady was suffering from postpartum psychosis when she killed her kids.”
Reddington’s closing argument followed the same theory. He told the jury that the Commonwealth’s experts had been called to establish that Clancy was not suffering from a disease or defect “at the time she killed her children.” Later, he said the prosecution had to prove that, “at the time that she killed these three beautiful kids,” she simply wanted to escape her life. He concluded:
“This young lady is not guilty of the killing of her children because she was suffering from a disease and defect, as His Honor instructed you, and they’re not going to be able to prove otherwise.”
He also told the jury that Clancy had cooperated with repeated evaluations and “owned what she did.”
The pretrial record was equally direct. When requesting a bifurcated trial, the defence stated that the actions resulting in the children’s deaths were “not a live issue” and offered to “stipulate formally in writing to her involvement.” Under that proposal, the only disputed question would have been her state of mind and lack of criminal responsibility.
None of those statements constituted evidence that the jury could substitute for proof from the Commonwealth. Nor did they legally prevent Reddington from renewing a sufficiency challenge after the mistrial. But they do establish what the defence theory presented to the jury actually was: Clancy killed the children, but she should not be held criminally responsible because she was suffering from a mental disease or defect.
That is materially different from the argument emphasized on September 29:
“Where is the admission? Where does she say that she did this?”
The procedural argument remained available. The factual narrative, however, had plainly shifted. The internet did not invent that contrast; it is visible in Reddington’s own words.
What Judge Sullivan Found About Who Killed the Children
Sullivan concluded that both physical and circumstantial evidence permitted a rational factfinder to conclude that Clancy killed Cora, Dawson and Callan.
His order points to evidence that included:
- Clancy’s deteriorating mental health and her earlier thoughts about harming the children;
- Patrick Clancy’s account of leaving to complete errands while Lindsay remained alone with them;
- surveillance footage that was consistent with Patrick’s account;
- Patrick’s return to find Lindsay seriously injured outside the home;
- the children discovered in the basement with exercise bands around their necks;
- the physical evidence and the medical examiner’s findings;
- computer records, telephone records and crime-scene photographs; and
- the evidence surrounding the timing of the deaths and Clancy’s fall from the second-floor window.
Sullivan wrote that the evidence, taken together and viewed under the Rule 25 standard, could support findings that Clancy was the only adult in the home when the children were killed and that she was responsible for their deaths.
That is not the same as declaring every investigative criticism meaningless. A police investigation can be imperfect and the remaining evidence can still be legally sufficient. Rule 25 does not ask whether investigators could have done more. It asks whether the evidence actually admitted at trial could support a conviction.
A flawed investigation does not automatically create a legally insufficient case—and a legally sufficient case does not prove the investigation was flawless.
What Sullivan Found About Criminal Responsibility
The more consequential portion of the ruling concerns Clancy’s mental state.
Under Massachusetts law, once lack of criminal responsibility is properly raised, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was criminally responsible. In simplified terms, the prosecution must establish that the defendant did not lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of her conduct or to conform her conduct to the requirements of law because of mental disease or defect.
Sullivan acknowledged the evidence of serious mental illness. But he emphasized that mental illness, standing alone, does not legally require a finding that a person lacked criminal responsibility.
The Commonwealth had introduced its own expert testimony, together with evidence about the nature and method of the killings and Clancy’s conduct and demeanour around the relevant time. The defence presented competing experts who believed she lacked criminal responsibility.
Sullivan did not decide which experts were ultimately correct. He held that choosing between those opinions—and deciding what inferences to draw from the surrounding conduct—was a task for a jury.
His conclusion was that the evidence, viewed favourably to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational jury to find criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt.
What the Judge Did Not Decide
This ruling did not:
- find Lindsay Clancy guilty;
- reject postpartum psychosis as a genuine illness;
- determine that she was criminally responsible as a factual matter;
- erase the reported 11–1 division in the first jury;
- order the Commonwealth to retry her;
- decide whether the mistrial was supported by “manifest necessity”;
- resolve the defence request to investigate the holdout juror; or
- impose the prosecution’s requested restrictions on public statements.
It simply leaves the indictments alive and preserves the Commonwealth’s ability to pursue the case—subject to the motions that remain unresolved.
What Is Still Scheduled for November 2
The next hearing is set for November 2, 2026. Based on the September 29 hearing and the filings described in subsequent reporting, the major unresolved matters include:
- The motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds. The defence argues that Judge Sullivan declared a mistrial without first exhausting a viable alternative: investigating whether the holdout juror could or should have been discharged. A retrial following a mistrial is generally permitted only when the mistrial was supported by “manifest necessity.” The Commonwealth was given additional time to respond to the defence’s lengthy memorandum.
- The request for juror records and a limited inquiry. The defence seeks information connected to the holdout juror, Michael P. Desronvil, including materials it says may bear on his voir dire answers, cellphone use and conduct during deliberations. Desronvil disputes the other jurors’ portrayal of him and has stated that he had no doubt about Clancy’s criminal responsibility.
- Issues involving impounded material. Counsel representing the juror requested limited access to impounded records so she could respond to the allegations. Sullivan asked for a more specific memorandum identifying what was sought. He indicated he might decide that request on the written submissions; otherwise, it could be addressed on November 2.
- The Commonwealth’s proposed restriction on extrajudicial statements. Prosecutors want an order limiting public comments by counsel, arguing that the publicity surrounding the first trial and its aftermath risks contaminating a future jury pool. Sullivan said the request raised significant constitutional and Massachusetts-law questions and scheduled it for November 2.
- The future schedule. The court expects the parties to discuss whether a retrial will be pursued and, if necessary, when it could occur. The prosecution had not publicly committed to another first-degree murder trial when the ruling was issued. Reddington told the court he would not be available to begin another trial before June 2027.
The defence motion concerning access to jury notes and sidebar discussions—and a related media-access request from The Boston Globe and WBZ—was argued on September 29 and taken under advisement. It should not be described as definitively postponed to November 2; Sullivan may resolve some access issues on the written record before then.
The Case the Internet Decided
The online reaction followed a pattern that has surrounded this case from the beginning: a technical ruling became a verdict within minutes.
For those convinced of Clancy’s guilt, the denial was treated as confirmation that the judge had seen through the defence and validated the prosecution’s entire case. For those convinced that postpartum psychosis eliminated criminal responsibility, the same order was treated as proof that the court ignored the psychiatric evidence and the views of eleven jurors.
Neither reaction matches what Sullivan decided.
Public posts also focused heavily on Reddington’s statement that there was “no evidence” Clancy committed the killings. Critics described it as an entirely new story invented after the mistrial. Supporters described it as nothing more than the routine preservation of every possible defence argument.
The truth lies somewhere less comfortable. The argument was legally available and had been preserved through earlier Rule 25 motions. But the September 29 presentation unmistakably sounded different from the defence narrative the public heard during trial. Both things can be true.
The reaction also exposed persistent confusion about the reported 11–1 split. Eleven jurors favouring a finding of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility is highly significant as a practical and strategic matter. It is not, however, a verdict. Massachusetts required unanimity. The judge’s Rule 25 task was not to count jurors and adopt the majority position; it was to determine whether the prosecution’s evidence met the minimum legal threshold for jury consideration.
Likewise, denial of the motion does not guarantee another trial. The prosecution must still decide what it intends to pursue, while Sullivan must confront the defence’s claim that the first mistrial legally bars a second prosecution.
Public social-media discussions are not a scientific measure of opinion, and individual posts should not be mistaken for verified facts. What they reveal is the same dynamic examined throughout this case: evidence, legal standards and procedural rulings are repeatedly reduced to fragments—and those fragments are then fitted into conclusions people reached long before the court finished speaking.
The Courtroom Record Versus the Online Verdict
| What happened in court | What it became online |
|---|---|
| The judge found the prosecution’s evidence legally sufficient under a prosecution-favourable standard. | “The judge found her guilty.” |
| Competing expert testimony created a factual question for a jury. | “The judge rejected postpartum psychosis.” |
| The defence challenged proof of both the killings and criminal responsibility. | Either “Reddington exposed that there was no case” or “the defence invented a new killer.” |
| The first jury returned no unanimous verdict. | “Eleven jurors acquitted her.” |
| The Rule 25 denial preserved the charges. | “A retrial has been ordered.” |
| Major constitutional and juror-related motions remain pending. | “The case is over.” |
The five-page order does not resolve the Lindsay Clancy case. It narrows the road ahead.
The court has now said the evidence was sufficient to go to a jury. On November 2, the harder procedural question moves to the centre: whether the law permits the Commonwealth to place that evidence before a second jury at all.
That is a different question from guilt. It is also a different question from what eleven jurors reportedly believed. And if this case has demonstrated anything, it is how quickly those differences disappear once the courtroom record reaches the internet.
Stay curious. Look closer. Keep the conversation going.
— Laurie
Sources & Resources
- Superior Court Order on Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Required Finding of Not Guilty — October 1, 2026
- Associated Press: Judge denies defence motion — October 1, 2026
- CBS Boston: Judge denies Rule 25 motion — October 1, 2026
- CT Insider: Five-page ruling and evidence cited by Sullivan — October 1, 2026
- CT Insider: Double-jeopardy dispute and November 2 issues — October 2, 2026
- CT Insider: Commonwealth’s request concerning extrajudicial statements — September 29, 2026
- Transcript of the September 29, 2026 hearing